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ETIQUETTE,
ETHICS,
AND
ESTHETICS
Jennifer Georgia

The extended eighteenth century has been touted, side by side, as an
age both of elegance and refinement, and of coarseness and brutality.
Modern criticism tends to emphasize the latter, while dismissing the
former as, at best, hypocritical posturing, or at worst, ideological
imperialism. It cannot be denied, however, that it was a century that
concerned itself greatly with issues of politeness and etiquette, issues
of which our age is suspicious. How could some of the most
profound thinkers of the time—and every major writer of the era,
from Defoe and Swift through Addison and Steele to Johnson and up
through Jane Austen, wrote on the subject of mannen—concern
themselves so deeply with a subject that today is universally
acknowledged to be trivial? Is it possible that there could be valid
cultural, artistic, and even ethical underpinnings to this eighteenthcentury preoccupation with politeness? If we stop for a moment to
give the issue the same thoughtful consideration it was awarded at the
time, the answers can be enlightening.
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^ The Rise of Refinement
With the profound upheaval of the civil wars still lingering in
memory, the early eighteenth century was somewhat wary of
dogmatic religious moral instruction. There was a strong felt need for
some new way of maintaining social order, without the extremism of
the previous century.
The best way to preserve the hard-won
domestic peace seemed to be not to inquire too closely into the
particular doctrinal foundations of behavior; but that same desire for
social order made controlling that behavior all the more paramount.
A new basis for social control had to be devised.
That basis was non-sectarian custom, rather than religious duty:
manners rather than morals. This period shows a marked interest in
the cultivation and reformation of manners in a much more secular
sense than ever before. As Norbert Elias documents in his multivolume study of manners The Civilizing Process', a rise in interest in
civilized behavior has historically accompanied increasing social
mobility and reductions in internal strife, from Italy in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries, to France in the seventeenth, to England in
the eighteenth. Etiquette is very much an adaptive mechanism to cope
with social change—and it is when etiquette does not adapt enough,
when it breaks down, that chaos ensues, as Burke noted in his
Reflections on the Revolution in France. It is in part a testament to
this combination of adaptability and stability in English manners that
the English upper classes did not bring upon themselves a revolution
of their own.
Thus, one foundation for the rising interest in manners was
political. At the same time, self-interest and aesthetic interest
combined to make people want to internalize more delicate
behavioral norms. Between the religious strictures of the seventeenth
century and the rise in Evangelical nioral fervor (not to mention
more effective police forces and more centralized state control) at the
end of the eighteenth, one of the few extant controls on behavior was
the nebulous, rapidly changing—and voluntary—system of manners.
' Norbert Elias, The History of Manners: The Civilizing Process, Volume I, tr. Edmund
Jephcoit (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). Power and Civility: The Civilizing Process,
Volume II, tr. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982).
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As Elias points out, perhaps the most basic element of the
civilizing process is self-control, and it is strongly related to power.
This idea is documented in the literature of the time. A major
message of Richardson's Sir Charles Grandison, for instance, is that
those who are subject to violent outbursts are actually less powerful
than those with better manners. Impulsive people make it clear that
a) they cannot control even themselves, and b) they have no security
in their relationship to the real sources of social power if they feel the
need to use violence.
But Elias overestimates the importance of
"the monopoly organization of physical violence" by the state.^
Grandison's argument against duelling has very little to do with fear
of legal reprisals and everything to do with ethical arguments and
what one owes one's own honor. It is overly simplistic to attribute
such philosophies to the mere internalization of state controls.
According to Elias, in earlier societies, while the powerful warriorlord had more opportunity to indulge his passions immediately, "He
had less control of his passions; he was more controlled by them."
But Elias then begins to follow another tack as he describes the
behavioral and even artistic process that follows:
Later...the individual learns to control himself more
steadily; he is now less a prisoner of his passions than before.
But as he is now more tightly bound by his functional
dependence on the activities of an ever-larger number of
people, he is much more restricted in his conduct, in his
chances of directly satisfying his drives and passions. Life
becomes in a sense less dangerous, but also less emotional or
pleasurable, at least as far as the direct release of pleasure is
concerned. And for what is lacking in everyday life a
substitute is created in dreams, in books and pictures. So, on
their way to becoming courtiers, the nobility read novels of
chivalry; the bourgeois contemplate violence and erotic
passion in films. ^
In addition to being expressed in literature and art, according to
Ehas, the struggle that used to take place physically between people
' Elias, Power and Civility, 239.
' Elias, Power and Civility, 242-3.
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is internalized, embodied in the battle of the superego against the
unconscious. A system of conscious controls and unconscious habits
is set up to control the impulses. Like most writers on this subject
since Freud, Elias goes to great lengths to describe the possible
problems fostered by this system. In his view, "a permanent,
apparently groundless inner unrest shows how many drive energies
are dammed up in a form that permits no real satisfaction" (243).
Furthermore, "The learning of self-controls, call them 'reason' or
'conscience,' 'ego' or 'super-ego,' and the consequent curbing of more
animahc impulses and affects, in short the civilizing of the human
young, is never a process entirely without pain; it always leaves
scars" (244), and those scars, unless the child is very "lucky," manifest
themselves as neuroses and ruined relationships later in life. Taking
this strongly Freudian line, Elias here assumes that there are certain
"natural" desires common to all, that are suppressed only at psychic
peril.
But many critics (practicing psychologists rather than
academics, interestingly enough) have begun to question Freud's
unproven link between repression and neurosis. And even within the
academy, some more recent theorists, notably Foucault, have pointed
out that desires are not necessarily natural and fundamental to human
nature, but socially conditioned. As Elias himself points out
elsewhere, different societies, and different individuals within those
societies, take differing amounts of pleasure in violence, for instance.
Levels of violence that were perfectly acceptable to one society or
segment of society can be frowned on by the next (or the process can
work in reverse, as we are finding out in our own society today). In
concentrating on civilization and its discontents, writing rather
wistfully about the immediate gratification of impulses open to
(certain privileged members oQ earlier societies, Elias vastly
underestimates the pleasures of restraint.
As the interest in refinement grew in the eighteenth century, the
earlier, more immediate and violent pleasures began to be considered
coarse, and delicacy of sentiment and sensation came to be prized.
(There are important aesthetic implications of this, which will be
discussed below.) To view this as neurotic self-delusion fostered by a
society no longer permitted to take "real" pleasure is inaccurate,
condescending "smug presentism" (to use J. Paul Hunter's charming
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term''), and strongly underestimates the power of social conditioning
as well as the variety of pleasures open to people.
So for a number of socio-political and socio-psychological reasons,
society in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century was
moving toward refinement and politeness. Even the religious works
of the time were, in a sense, conduct books. As Hunter puts it, "by
far the majority of reUgious texts were in 'practical divinity'—that is,
works that addressed ethical issues of behavior in daily life" (86). He
elaborates:
Readers who covet no imaginary substitute for life may well
need, nearly all the time, a guide for it. In books like The
Practise of Pietie, The Whole Duty of Man, and A Serious Call to
a Devout and Holy Life...xeoAtxs were supposed to be able to
find, according to their cultural guardians, useful advice about
manners and customs. When the Bible was not particular or
accessible enough. Guides like these were widely expected to
fill specific needs, and probably they did for many readers,
especially in the generations before the novel emerged and
began to cover, in narrative and fictional form, some of the
same ground. The casuistical tradition, especially in its Puritan
forms, in which specific cases of conscience were examined in
detail in relation to general ethical principles, carried
didacticism to more and more particular lengths in sermons,
pamphlets, and periodicals designed especially to the purpose.
Here, too, readers might find thoughtful consideration of
practical questions about behavior in the real world, with firm
advice about how to survive. (92)
Thus, conduct books became more and more socially oriented as the
period progressed, turning increasingly from admonitory reform tracts
to more practical how-to manuals to aid the transitional classes in
moving in their new social circles. Hunter aigues that the more
literary, polished didactic works never approached the popularity of
the earlier, plainer works, and given the publication figures on The
Whole Duty of Man, which went through mote than 138 editions by
J. Paul Hunter, B^ore Novels: The Cultural Contexts cf Eighteenth Century English Fiction
(New York: Norton, 1990), 56.
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1800, this is apparently true. But the lower figures for later works
could also stem from tastes changing towards a wider range of reading
materials, including more specialized guides, and novels. Competition
in a growing marketplace might have limited the circulation of those
works that did not already have a long tradition of popularity behind
them. Hunter himself admits that, even among the dissenting middle
class, "the taste for sermons, such as it was, faded early in the
eighteenth century" (250).
The dissenters' increased interest in proper behavior in this life
reflects their increasing social status. When oppressed groups are so
persecuted as to make any worldly gain impossible, they tend to
concentrate their hopes on the next life.
Now, new social
opportunities were opening up, and the new literature demonstrates
their eagerness to take advantage of these opportunities. They began
to imitate their betters, and, as we shall see, the behavior of their
betters began changing as well, in a number of ways.
On the aristocratic side, the influence of classical, liberal education
had a strong effect on evolving manners instruction. "For the elite,
Greek and Latin Classics inculcated politeness, style, the graces, and
a habit of superiority," according to Roy Porter.^ Many of the works
on manners quote Cicero's De Officiis, which is, in a sense, the father
of all conduct books. Ethics, according to Cicero, is practical
philosophy, one goal of which is "practical rules by which daily life
in all its bearings may be regulated" And indeed, the later parts of
Book I, concerned with modesty, dress, bearing, conversation, etc.,
read very much like later conduct books. Cicero's "Cardinal Virtues"
include things to do with "conservation of organized society, with
rendering every man his due, and with the faithful discharge of
obligations assumed" and with "the orderliness and moderation with
which everything is said and done, wherein consist temperance and
self-control" (Bk. I. Sect. 15)—just those civic qualities of which early
Georgian society felt so desperately in need.
Thus, just as Puritan conduct instruction was "practical divinity,"
the far older Cicero provided "practical philosophy." Eighteenthcentury conduct books were, in a sense, a meeting ground for classical
' Roy Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1990),
158.
' Cicero. De Officiis. Translated as Cicero on Moral Obligation, with an Introduction and
Notes by John Higginbotham. (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), I. HI. 7.
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ethical philosophy and Christian religious morality.
The late
Restoration and Augustan periods saw the rise of a new mode
embodying this new concern with civil behavior. Coming on the
heels of civil strife, the genre is an interesting synthesis of influences
from both ends of the social spectrum.
It was a period in which manners were a force for increasing (if
not perfect) egalitarianism, and the breaking down of divisive social
differences. It was a feature of the Enhghtenment, and it took its cue,
again, from Cicero, who wrote, "In a word,...it is our duty to respect,
defend, and maintain the common bonds of union and fellowship
subsisting between all the members of the human race" ^. Shaftesbury
continued the theme, explaining that "All politeness is owing to
liberty. We polish one another, and rub off our corners and rough
sides by a sort of amicable collision"^
Thomas Woodman argues that, in spite of such opinions voiced by
these illustrious writers and others including Pope and Swift, "The
ideological attempt to underpin politeness by reason does not make
it any more democratic." The reason he gives for this is that
"Natural civility might be universal, but particular ceremonies could
not simply be ignored. It was still necessary when in Rome to do
what the Romans did."' Why we should equate ignoring ceremonies
with democracy is unclear; he seems to be confusing democracy with
anarchy. Having to know the particular ceremonies of a locale is no
more anti-democratic than having to know the language (although
there are those today who also aigue that even a common language
is an infringement of civil liberties). What Woodman is trying to
explain is the difference between natural manners and local custom,
a point I discuss more below.
Allowing that manners had democratizing power does not
contradict the fact that the recognition of a need for manners often
comes in response to troubled times. Nor should this fact be taken
as some sort of evidence of hypocrisy underlying the manners system,
as Woodman implies when he says.

' Cicero, De Officiis, I. XLI. 149.
' Shaftesbury, Charaaeristics cf Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. John M. Roberson.
Indianapolis (Bobbs-MerrilJ, 1964), Vol. 1, 84.
' Thomas Woodman, Politeness and Poetry in the Age tf Pope (London and Toronto:
Associated University Presses, 1989), 25.

306

1650-1830

There is often a sense that tolerance, good humor, and restraint
are being emphasized because of the need to paper over the
cracks. No wonder that Steele wrote: "in all the little
Intercourses of Life...a Man ought to sacrifice his private
Inclinations and Opinions to the Practice of the Publick"
{Spectator No. 576); that Budgell advised: "Avoid Disputes as
much as possible" {Spectator No. 197); or that Shaftesbury put
forward good manners as the precise antidote to the divisive
effects of religious zeal ("Letter Concerning Enthusiasm"). (23)
In our post-Romantic age, where honesty is valued above all else no
matter what harm it does, private inclinations are to be pursued above
all, and conflict is in itself deemed psychologically healthy, such
advice seems contrary to all our cherished rules of self-assertion. But
for the writers of the eighteenth century, who had just come through
a century of religious and civil strife, "Papering over the cracks" is
not quite the right metaphor for an age that still recognized a sinful
human nature requiring the restraint of morals, reason and habit.
The most striking way in which eighteenth-century conduct
literature, as it became less religious in tone, differed from works of
instruction that came before is its focus (like that of that other new
genre that followed, the novel) on every-day conduct in social life.
Samuel Johnson, writing on Addison in his Prefaces, Biographical and
Critical, to the Works of the English Poets (1781), recognized the
change:
Before the Tatler and the Spectator, if the writers for the
theatre are excepted, England had no masters of common life.
No writers had yet undertaken to reform either the savageness
of neglect, or the impertinence of civility; to teach when to
speak, or to be silent; how to refuse, or how to comply. We
wanted not books to teach us our more important duties, and
to settle opinions in philosophy or politics; but an Arbiter
elegantiarum, a judge of propriety, was yet wanting, who
should survey the track of daily conversation, and free it from
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thorns and prickles, which teaze the passer, though they do not
wound him.'°
Johnson, although he was astute in analyzing its character, is not
quite accurate about who was first in this kind of writing; important
conduct books such as Rules of Civility and the Gentlewomans
Companion appeared thirty years before Addison and Steele. But in
terms of showing the new mannerly emphasis and tone of moral
instruction, and disseminating it widely, the authors of The Tatler and
The Spectator are most significant. It was Addison and Steele who
really brought together most of these elements and set them before
the general public. They made literary and acceptable what the
Companion and Defoe had already started, melding form and
function, infusing the instructive matter the middle classes wanted to
read with the very elegance and politeness they wanted that matter to
teach them.
And this conduct literature is indeed a new form. It is neither the
intense interior soul-searching of Puritan sermons, nor the more
appearance-oriented, pragmatic instructions in courtly behavior of
aristocratic courtesy books; it is something between the two, set in
a different realm. Its setting is neither the City nor the Court, but
that place where denizens of both were meeting with increasing
frequency, the Town, which was also coming to be known,
significantly, as "The World."
The melding of these different styles of manners can be seen as the
arena where the schisms of the civil wars were finally healed, where
the strains of Whig and Tory, Dissenter and High Church, Merchant
and Aristocrat, finally came together—or at least declared a polite
cessation of hostilities. Johnson saw, too, that the purpose of the
Spectator was to help salve these wounds, "to divert the attention of
the people from public discontent." He noted that it was "published
at a time when two parties, loud, restless and violent, each with
plausible declarations...were agitating the nation; to minds heating
with political contest, they applied cooler and more inoffensive
reflections." And Addison himself maintained that it "drew men's
Minds off from the bitterness of Party" {Spectator IGTj.
Quoted in Bonamy Dobree, English Literature in the Early Eighteenth Century, 2700-1740
(London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 27-8.
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But it was more than just political distraction. Out of this
concern for civility and politeness grew a new tone of social
discourse.
Nouveaux riches, whose egoism had known no manners, needed
to win acceptance. Beset by bewildering change, temptations
and anxieties, many substantial citizens sought to put their own
houses in order. Moderation, decorum and accommodation
were needed....The dolce vita was to be enjoyed, but only
through behaviour which was liberal, polite and genteel.
Given that so many of the propertied had indeed been splenetic
boors, bigots, braggarts and drunkards, and their sons
profligates, the Spectatorial call to gentility was not foppish
tinsel, but crucial to personal and social adjustment, the best
resource for ensuring enjoyment. Restraint, control and
propriety were vital if society was not to explode in their face.
(Porter 302)
The moral writing of the Augustan period marks an important
transition between the published sermon and the etiquette book;
from a highly religious to a profoundly secular society. The
progression in the eighteenth century "seems to have been from a
morality based on God's commandments, to a morality based on
nature, to a morality based on feeling and social custom."
It is the
interaction of the two sides that gives the moral teaching of the age
its particular flavor. In the search for refinements of behavior, the
elegance of the aristocracy married with the moral tone of the
bourgeoisie, and the factions of the civil war finally found a common
ground. This movement towards morality through manners (and not
manners at the expense of morality) was central to the secularization
that shaped the age.
Religion was still considered necessary, but more for social reasons
than spiritual. As Chesterfield wrote to his son:
Depend upon this truth, that every man is the worse looked
upon & the less trusted, for being thought to have no religion.
" John K Sheriff, The Cood-Natured Man: The Evolution of a Moral IdeaU 1660-1800
(University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 17.
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in spite of all the pompous & specious epithets he may assume,
of esprit fort, free thinker or moral philosopher; a wise atheist
(if such a thing there is) would, for his own interest, &
character in the world, pretend to some religion.'^
It was a period in which the church itself could be seen in terms of
manners. Dr. Arbuthnot described the Church of England in this
period as "well bred without Affectation, in the due mean between
one of your affected Curtesying pieces of formality, and your romps
that have no regard to the common Rules of Civility."
It is no
accident that the ideal he describes is one of balance between undue
reserve and excess, the political and social ideal of the day.
It was not religion that the Georgians abandoned so much as
radicalism, and the upheaval that accompanied it.
As Pope
emphasized in the Essay on Man, "For Modes of Faith, let graceless
zealots fight" (3: 305). Theirs was a practical, moderate, and worldly
religion. Johnson considered the fervent practices of Wesley's
Methodism "utterly incompatible with social or civil society," and
Joseph Butler, Bishop of Durham, felt that "Enthusiasm is a very
horrid thing." Porter concludes:
Opinion leaders complimented themselves on their religious
moderation; there had been much, they believed, in religion
in need of being moderated. Faith ought to be a force for
restraint and civilization.
Desperate for security after
generations of blistering sectarian strife, Geoigians saw
meekness as the Gospel's first commandment. (170)
(Thus, exhortations to modesty and meekness were not, as modern
commentators tend almost universally to assume, dastardly attempts
to stifle women, but a heartfelt response to both religious and
political needs, for both sexes.) While live-burnings for heresy were
still being performed into the eighteenth century in both Calvinist
and Catholic Europe, England, through the evolution of morals into
manners, became a relative model of religious tolerance.
" Quoted in Porter, 170.
" John Arbuthnot,/oin Bu// Still in his Senses (1712), cited by Robert Steensma, Dr. John
Arbuthnot (Boston: Twayne, 1979), 61.
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But at the same time that religion was being modified by
politeness, politeness, at least as practiced by the aristocracy, was
being modified by religion. Just how far apart the religious attitudes
of the upper and middle classes were at the beginning of this period,
and how they were beginning to mix, can be seen from an anecdote:
The wife of Robert Harley, formerly middle-class and now the Earl
of Oxford, "used to talk about the Lord Jehovah. 'Oh, dear Madam,'
once exclaimed the Duchess of Shrewsbury, 'who is that? I believe
'tis one of the new titles, for I never heard of him before'
But
such religious and moral ignorance among the aristocracy was
beginning to change. As Porter notes, "Bourgeois Nonconformity
contributed something unique to English culture: scruple. Theirs
was an earnest, conscientious desire to exercise control—over self and
others alike—for righteousness's sake" (180). It was this moral
earnestness that began to color upper class behaviour during the
century, almost as much as a desire to mimic the refinements of the
rich colored the behavior of those below them. Both of them became
synthesized as codes of etiquette and overtook both religious
dogmatism and courtly tradition in the course of the eighteenth
century.

Manners and Community
Thus, eighteenth-century thinkers felt, or at least hoped, that the
society was reuniting after the schisms between Puritan religious
fervor and Restoration court profligacy. Addison and Steele tried "to
heal the damaging seventeenth-century split between courtly social
refinement and Protestant seriousness" (Woodman 28). And for a
while, I would argue, through manners, they succeeded. As Bonamy
Dobree puts it,
in the eighteenth century the new sentimentality, combined
with the old taste, produced for a short fifty years a happy
state of ever-increasing humanity. There was still much
brutahty, but society was becoming aware of it....For in the
" W. S. Sichel, Bolinghroke and His Times, vol. I. 74, quoted in Samuel Shellabarger, Lord
Chesterfield and His World (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1951).
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period of political stability attained in what we may roughly
call the age of Walpole, religious controversy lost most of its
old acerbity; an energetic people whose imagination was
turned to practical matters had leisure to be busied about itself,
its way of living and the bases of it.
This is a rosy portrait of the age that many current critics take issue
with, perhaps as much on principle as on the evidence. Hunter, for
instance, claims that the social changes of the age, and the novel as the
literary form they spawned, had a "tendency both to probe and
promote loneliness and solitariness, rather ironic in view of the
novel's expressed design to portray people in their societal context....
Somehow the novel has always communicated a terrible sense of
isolation and articulated dramatically the breakdown of the
relationships between individuals...whatever the relationship between
people, there is always a sense of incompleteness, isolation, and
frustration that approaches despair" (39).
Such statements seem overdramatic and hardly appropriate for the
period. To the contrary. Porter asserts that in the eighteenth century,
"Blessed were the convivial. Solitary people were pitied and
diagnosed as morose, melancholic, boorish: sociability integrated
people, invigorated the faculties, and knocked off rough edges" (226).
Hunter's views seem especially unfortunate coming from someone
who otherwise has such a strong grasp of the dangers of "presentism,"
but who here seems to be imposing a full-blown sense of twentiethcentury alienation onto what could at most be seen as its first
glimmer. Novel-reading may be a more solitary activity than playgoing, but it is certainly more wide-reaching than traditional belles
lettres. Hunter himself points out that the writers in the new genre
wrestle consciously with the rhetorical task of making "all kinds of
people feel at home in their texts" (43). And novels did seem to
have a communal effect on a wide range of readers. As evinced by
Ian Watt's story in The Rise of the Novel of the actual town-wide joy
which greeted the fictional Pamela's marriage, where the villagers'
rushing en masse to ring the church bells to celebrate is in a sense the
first bestseller phenomenon, and by the later rise of reading aloud in
Bonamy Dobree, English Literature in the Early Eighteenth Century^ 1700-1740 (New York
and London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 15.
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groups, the effect of the novel was probably more socially cohesive
than otherwise. Even Hunter admits that "Reading might have been
done in private, but its consequences were public, active, implicative.
Novels were, to most novelists, just one more species in which to
work their skills and promote their ethical and social ideas" (296).
Hunter is right that heavy migrations to the cities led to increases
in both loneliness and crowds. But society was in the process of
engineering new methods of social interaction necessary to life in
those urowded cities. Porter adds, "In a world intimate enough for
personal power still to count, yet fluid enough to be increasingly
anonymous, form and address were crucial visas. The finesses of
etiquette helped to secure entree and advancement in a world of social
niceties" (303). Similarly, as Elias points out, as employment became
more specialized, and people more interdependent, new rules sprang
up to govern their interrelationships.
This was a process as long as civilization, but during the nascent
urban, industrial age, both the pace and the method changed
somewhat. It was not so much, as Hunter argues, that urban anomie
and alienation usurped the golden age of community that had come
before, but that a new kind of community had to be built, in new
ways. New overcrowding led to rules concerning privacy being as
important as those concerning neighborliness. As the socio-linguists
Brown and Levinson'^ point out, the desire to be left alone can be as
important as the desire to be treated in a friendly fashion. They call
the latter "positive politeness" and the former "negative politeness,"
unfortunately reinforcing somewhat by their terminology the
misconception that this aspect of etiquette is cold, aloof, and
snobbish. But in a rapidly expanding urban population, such
methods for protecting what is now often termed "personal space"
became more and more vital. The rules that Elias describes as being
integral to the civilizing process, such as increasing squeamishness
about bodily fluids and functions and the desire to screen them from
the view of others, are part and parcel of the invention of privacy
that Roger Chartier describes as being the hallmark of the period.^''
Hunter claims that the novel helped exacerbate "The process of
" Penelope Brown, and Stephen C. Levinson, Politeness: Some Universds in Language Usage
(Cambridge University Press, 1987).
" Roger Chartier, ed., A History of Private Life, Volume III: Passions cf the Renaissance
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1989).
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lowering the traditional barrier between public and private" (38)
because its confessional, exbibitionistic nature made voyeurs of
readers. As both Elias and Pbillipe Aries'® have pointed out,
however, the sense of private life, rather than being eroded, was
increasing at this time, in everything from behaviour to architecture,
and I would ai^ue that the novel increased this effect, both by
encouraging reading in private (the very thing Hunter elsewhere
claims reflected alienation) and by validating the private by
emphasizing it.
At the same time, however, increasing privacy does not mean
isolation. The rituals of community were highly important.
Overall, community wisdom felt the need for peace,
neighborliness and harmony deep in its bones (it had to, for
communities were highly disputatious and even litigious).
Ringing through popular feeling was the chorus of Hospitality.
The flowing bowl, the pipe of tobacco...processions, oaths,
healths, toasts, pledging—these were the ways people sought to
patch quarrels and keep neighbours sweet, or hoped to sugar
the bitter pills of life. (Porter 155)
In urban areas where this need was felt, clubs and friendly societies
flourished, often taking the place of more traditional parish-based
social organizations. Of course, as Hunter points out, it was far more
difficult to maintain peer-group and community-elder pressures in a
more mobile, urban society; but the need for them was recognized,
and conduct books stepped in to fill the gap in loco parentis, both
reinforcing old behavioral patterns and modifying them or
establishing new ones, as changing social circumstances required.
Later, novels began to fill a similar function; Evelina's learning to
operate in "the world" without her guardian's constant guidance is an
object lesson to that end.
Conduct books and novels were instrumental in this process, the
former on the more practical side, the latter perhaps on the somewhat
more philosophical. Even the books themselves were viewed in social
terms. The metaphor of books as companions, although by no means
Phillipe Aries, "Introduction" in Roger Chartier, ed., A History of Private Life^ Volume III:
Passions of the Renaissance (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1989).
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unknown to the likes of Renaissance writers like Montaigne, becomes
very common in this period.
As William Law puts it, "We
commonly say, that a Man is known by his Companions, but it is
certain, that a Man is much more known by the Books that he
converses with. These Closet-companions with whom we chuse to be
alone and in private, are never-failing Proofs of the State and
Disposition of our Hearts.But rather than being a substitute for
human companionship, books such as novels and conduct books, in
their very use of the social metaphor, both provide for and
demonstrate the need for contact in a fragmented social structure.
Although such early novels as those of Defoe may have emphasized
solitariness, the trend in the novel over the course of the period is to
promote social integration. In fact, I would go so far as to say that
the basic plot of the novel involves the protagonist finding his or her
place in society. In a comedy, such as Evelina or Tom Jones, that
place is achieved. In a tragedy, such as (from the secular point of
view) Clarissa, it is not. Rather than being, "in spite of its famous
societal concerns, an essentially individualistic and isolationistic form,"
(Hunter 42) the novel is, like its predecessor and relation the conduct
book, a genre that tries to teach newly aware individuals how to
function in a changing society.
In order to have the authority to teach, conduct advice, in all its
varying forms, had to appeal to community consensus, sometimes
even before that consensus existed. Woodman seems slightly
disturbed by this process:
Addison and Steele, in a brilliant mystification, use public
opinion—consensus—as their source of authority in the very act
of helping to create such a consensus. The mode of free,
apparently random discourse is used to disguise an ideological
program, or rather is its entirely appropriate medium.
"Addison and Steele," it has been said, "more successfully than
any preceding English writers translated the tone of civilized
oral exchange into print. The easy flow of written speech
became not only their literary signature but their avowal of
communal identity."
' A Practical Treatise upon Christian Perfection (1726), 351, quoted in Hunter, 365.
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This, like the social life it mimics, is a genuine, perhaps an
enviable cultural achievement. (27)
Rather than implying that their appeal to public opinion somehow
casts their enterprise in a suspicious light, as Woodman does here, it
can be argued that, in semiotic arenas like manners and language, the
appeal to consensus, whether or not that consensus actually exists, is
the only basis for authority. Although Woodman, hke many writers
who see cultural movements primarily in terms of ideology, feels
compelled to insert terms like "mystification" and "disguise," his
estimate of Addison and Steele's achievement is valid, and he cannot
keep his admiration of it frdm creeping in at the end. Later, he
carries his estimate further:
Politeness is in fact central to Pope's purpose here of
assimilating modern developments to all that is best from the
past....It must be made appropriate to a new audience and
amenable to a new consensus.
Consensus is indeed the essence of this politeness. (122-3)
And it is such a consensus that Pope, Addison, Steele, and all the
other conduct writers of the early eighteenth century were using
politeness to establish, to repi.ir the damage caused by the divisiveness
of the preceding century.
This reliance on consensus leads, however, to a paradox: What of
an immoral society? If morality is what the group says it is, what
standard can there be for criticizing the morality of the group? This
was precisely the problem at the end of the Restoration, when the
morals of the Court rakes and their mistresses held sway—half of the
Scylla and Charybdis from which manners were supposed to rescue
the society.
The answer I would posit is that if communality is the point of
socially-based systems, any element or rule in the system which can
be judged to be against the well-being of others, can be judged to be
wrong in the system—even if it was somehow created by the system.
Thus we can argue against total moral relativism. By creating a larger
community, the mannerly consensus of the eighteenth century
brought the values of the bourgeoisie into contact with the
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aristocracy, and thus shifted somewhat the ground upon which the
community's values were judged.
A more delicate problem is that of the single dissident: should the
voice of an individual be heeded when it goes against the wishes of
the group? The answer is related to the above: if the individual can
argue that the objections are based on harm to the group, and can
convince other group members of the justice of the argument, then
the group can agree to change the harmful practice. If the dissident
is simply arguing that he or she doesn't like something, the group has
a right to ignore the objection. This system must take into account
the group's value for individual rights; justice to the individual
should be a group value, since the group is made up of individuals,
and no individual should be demanded or expected by others to
sacrifice him or herself for the welfare of the group, although the
person may alone decide to do so if he or she feels it is necessary.
The point of democracy in a communally-based system is for each
person to try to influence the community in what he or she thinks
is important, not to stand on personal rights at any cost.
The same standards can be applied to community-based ethics or
manners as to language: they can change, and individuals do not have
a great deal of power over the changes, but careful, conscious usage,
with the goals of the system in mind (language: communication,
ethics: good of the community, manners: both), can keep changes
positive. These are the kinds of changes that the writers of both
conduct advice and novels were trying to achieve; they upheld the
values of the community in all things they deemed reasonable, and
attempted, through persuasion and example of differing types
depending on the requirements of the genre, to change those elements
of the system they felt were harmful.

^ Morals and Manners ^
But did the general trend toward secularization mark a loss of the
concept of morality? Does the shift from morals to manners mean
a descent from philosophy to triviality? This idea is widespread—just
about every modern author who writes on this topic feels compelled
to mention the frivolity of the subject—but this is based, I think, on
a mistaken view of the relationship between manners and morals in
our post-Victorian age. As a perusal of the Oxford English Dictionary
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will show, the very definitions of these words themselves have
changed, moving along a continuum from a more deeply ethical sense
to a more outward, social sense, but they have always been closely
related. Although one spelling of "ethic" in the fifteenth century was
"etique," making etiquette sound almost like a diminutive of ethics,
the two words actually have no relation etymologically. However,
the close relation between the concepts can be seen in the origin of
ethics "from the Latin ethic-us, from the Greek WiKog, f. ridog
character, pi. manners." The third definition of ethics in the O.E.D.
is "The rules of conduct recognized in certain associations or
departments of human life" and the eighteenth-century usage example
that follows is significant: "1789 BENTHAM Princ. Legist. Now to
instruct each individual in what manner to govern his own conduct
in the details of life, is the particular business of private ethics." This
sounds very much like a definition of the eighteenth-century conductbook.
A similar relationship can be traced in the definitions of manners
and morals. Each occupies five columns in the O.E.D., but there are
telling similarities and differences. Morals descends "from the Latin
moralis, f. mar-, custom, pi. mores manners, morals, character." Thus,
in the original Latin, it subsumed both manners and morals as we
define them today, much as does the current French word for the
same concepts, moeurs. Moralis was originally coined by Cicero as a
Latin rendering of the Greek ethic, traced above. Manners sprang from
the French related to the Latin for "belonging to the hand," i.e.
"mode of handling." Its earliest uses included, "A person's habitual
behaviour or conduct, esp. in reference to its moral aspect; moral
character, morals" and "In a more abstract sense: Conduct in its
moral aspect; also, morality as a subject of study; the moral code
embodied in general custom or sentiment." Both of these usages had
become obsolete by the end of the eighteenth century, to be
overtaken by the senses of "The modes of life, customary rules of
behaviour, conditions of society, prevailing in a people" and "External
behaviour in social intercourse, estimated as good or bad according to
its degree of politeness or of conformity to the accepted standard of
propriety."
If this seems confusing, there is a reason for it. We look on these
words from the end of a long process of changing connotations, in
which the distinction between manners and morals, ethics and etiquette
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has become increasingly more pronounced. Whereas now they are
seen as nearly opposites, throughout their long history, they have
been very close together indeed. In 1651, Hobbes could even reverse
our usage of the terms, defining manners as "those qualities of
mankind that concern their being together in peace, and unity," in
contrast to "small morals" such "as how one man should salute
another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth
before company"^® From the usage citations in the O.E.D., it becomes
apparent that "morals" picked up its current definition after
"manners" for the most part lost it.
Although many of the modern senses of words like "manners" and
"polite" appeared quite early, they seem to have been subject to a
general loss of seriousness. In every definition the meanings become
increasingly trivialized over time. It is difficult for us to comprehend
the importance of these concepts in the earlier eras, because the words
themselves have become debased. It is important to maintain the
connection between them, in order to understand the mind-set of the
time. As Woodman puts it.
To make mores simply equal morals would be to destroy the
connection between gentle birth and gentle behavior and to
minimise the importance of the social dimension. To make
mores simply equal manners in the modern sense would on the
other hand be to trivialize the social system by removing its
ordained ethical supports. (34)
The eighteenth century was the period of highest interest, and
most rapid change, in these subjects. This was when the term
"etiquette" was introduced into English by Lord Chesterfield, and
when the terms "polite" (from the Latin for "to polish") and
"propriety" came to be applied to behavior and even to literature.
The number of words coined out the Latin for these concepts show
both the need for new ways to express these concepts, and the
classical sources of the philosophy behind them. This was a time
when morals and manners were still more closely linked than we
perceive them to be today, and both were joined in the concept of
human society.
Leviathan I. xi. init.
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To get a clearer picture of how morals and manners were related
in the eighteenth century, perhaps a different perspective is in order.
Having spent a good deal of time exploring diachronic changes in
these concepts, it might be helpful to examine them synchronically.
The highest definition of "manners" in the eighteenth century could
be summed up as the outward expression of inward virtues, primarily
the classical virtues so highly prized at this time, but still strongly
informed by Christian virtues. Perhaps the best expression of this
moral foundation and the dichotomy it resolved appears in the 1752
English translation of the French etiquette writer Toussaint's Manners-.
By MANNERS, I mean a conduct regulated by the
knowledge and love of VIRTUE. I say, the knowledge and
love: for without the knowledge of virtue, we shall have only
the manners of the vulgar; and without the love of it, only the
manners of the great; or, in other words, none at all....civility
is a DUTY prescribed by the law of REASON. It is with
respect to men, what external worship is with regard to the
DEITY; a public testimony of our internal sentiments.^'
This is not the religious fervor of the seventeenth century, certainly.
But this type of morality has a long pedigree, stretching back through
both its aristocratic and puritan parents to works of moralists such as
Aristotle and Cicero and even to the Bible, all of which taught that
ethics has as its sphere the conduct of everyday life.
The eighteenth century was obsessed by the complementary
subjects of civility and virtue. The two were considered far more
closely related than we would admit today, and they were not
necessarily hierarchically arranged—even the Christian duty to love
one's neighbor was justified in social terms, being "common CiviHty •
to God," according to Matthew Towle^^. Their relationship was,
however, carefully structured, and can be set out with the help of the
techniques of the relatively systematic discipline of semiotics. Thus
we can use modern techniques to address the old-fashioned question
of morality.
Toussaint, Manners, English translation (London: 1752), 2-3 [Houghton Library].
^ Towle, Matthew, The }hung GENTLEMAN and LADY'S PRIVATE TUTOR (Oxford and
London: J. Fletcher, 1770).
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^ The Manners Fan
The diagram I have called the Manners Fan [Figure 1] depicts the
larger structure and meanings of the etiquette system in its most ideal
form, relating the etiquette-act signifiers to one set of signifieds
current in the eighteenth century, manners and virtue.^' Although I
will be describing the layout of the fan in modern, systematic terms,
I think it is a fairly accurate representation of the relationship of these
concepts as perceived by the conduct writers of the eighteenth
century. For instance, in the Preface to THE Young GENTLEMAN and
LADY'S PRIVATE TUTOR (1770), Matthew Towle explains that "In
the following Treatise, Piety and Virtue are the Foundation; they are
the Tree, and every other Part are the Branches thereof." A tree is a
basic structuralist diagram, not far removed from my image of the
fan, which seemed appropriate both for its connotations of
continuous spectrum and for its mannerly associations. As I move
through the explanation of the fan, I will from time to time cite
appropriate supporting quotations.
Moving from the rim of the fan inward, etiquette can be seen as
the outward, socially mandated expression of manners, which are the
manifestations in human interaction of virtues, which are the
particular methods of the quest for the good. Given Hume's idea of
custom as essentially the basis for morality, it is not unwarranted to
move from etiquette on the outside to virtue, within. In this sense,
the ring farthest out shows the particular community-created actions
which are the arbitrary signifiers of the more interior virtues; virtues
which are actually felt as manners (the middle ring), and which are
only intellectualized abstractly as ethical "virtues" (the innermost
ring).
In other work I use semiotic methods to describe the workings of etiquette as a langua^,
whose syntax, as it were, involves binary or triadic manemes^ governed by contextual and
relational cases, being operated upon by four basic functions: presentation to convey such
messages as gestures of respect for superiors; reciprocation among equals in such actions as
present-giving, hospitality and compliments; prohibition in matters of decency and modesty;
and moderation or finding the mean, in questions of complaisance and decorum. (See Jennifer
Georgia, "Polite Literature: Etiquette Books and the Novel in Eighteenth Century England,"
Chapter 3: Semiotics of Etiquette: The Grammar of Manners [Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation, Harvard University, 1994].) But the fan schematically links these processes to
their deeper structure, that of ethics, or virtue.
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This is the relationship Woodman (and indeed many before him)
was trying to explore, between "natural" manners, that is, virtue as
perceived by reason, and the customs peculiar to a particular locale.
Swift took a typically pessimistic view of this relationship; "All the
civilized nations of the world have agreed upon fixing some rules for
common behaviour, best suited to their general customs, as a kind of
artificial good sense to supply the defects of reason."
But even if
reason is the capacity of all homo sapiens, it requires education and
training to take root. In this period when classical writers were being
revived and taken as authorities. Swift would have been aware of
Cicero's dictum that reason has little force without the inculcation of
proper habits. In more modern terms, manners, like language, are an
in-built capacity of humans, but their particular expressions, the forms
they take in any particular society, must be learned. The two are not
in conflict, but are related the way a word in a particular language is
related to the concept underlying it, a concept which can
simultaneously exist in other languages as well.
This, too, was apparent to etiquette theorists at the time. Of
Civility, one of the main branches of manners, Matthew Towle
writes.
Civility in Man, is a sweet obliging disposition, whereby he
shews to his Friend, or any one else his Esteem; this is his
external Method of shewing his Humanity; this is done by
shewing his Friend some Marks of his Benevolence and Respect
Every country hath different Ways of
towards him:
distinguishing their Civility, but you must learn that of your
own: To be civil is no more than your Duty to all Men, it is
necessary then for you to have Civility. You see Master
Goodman is esteemed for his Civility; he is courteous and
kind, he is an Example to all the young Gentlemen of the same
School, he is beloved by his Master, and all his School Fellows,
they all admire him for it; you cannot want any Thing that is
in his Power to let you have, but he gives it you without a
Word; he is obliging to all Strangers, as well as to his
Acquaintance; if one of his School Fellows should want any
Swift, "On Good Manners and Good Breeding," Prose Works 4: 214, quoted in Woodman
105.
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Thing to be done, he doth it with so much good Nature and
Ease, that every one must like him. . . . Therefore learn
Civility." (Towle 79)
Thus there is a useful difference between the etiquette level of the fan
and those higher up: although etiquette is as intimately connected to
manners and morals as signifier to signified, semiotic methods provide
means to analyze etiquette without its moral content, just as they
have provided methods of analyzing language itself without its
semantic content. This does not mean that the content does not exist
but that it can be theoretically put aside while one examines the form
and how the system functions. Also, since the signifiers on this level
are arbitrary, in that their meanings are culturally, rather than
"naturally" determined, they can mean other things, if the culture so
determines. This explains how etiquette can have both moral and
amoral meaning, depending on the usage of the group. The passage
just cited is a good example of this very duality. In the same
paragraph where he gives humanity as the foundation for civility,
Towle gives another set of reasons for the behaviours prescribed by
etiquette—self-interest, the desire to be beloved and esteemed. Quite
often in etiquette writings, these seemingly contradictory reasons are
given side by side, one reason that etiquette has frequently been
accused of hypocrisy. As is well known to any reader of the period's
novels, a well-mannered cad can behave perfectly correctly, while
being deeply morally wrong.
But rather than being totally
contradictory, the two different foundations for manners are different
sets of signifieds for the same set of signifiers. In both cases the
meaning, although arbitrary, is imposed by usage, and not in any way
random.
There are two common folk definitions of etiquette, the "it's only
conventional behavior" definition and the "it's only consideration for
others" definition. The fan demonstrates both how oversimplistic
these definitions are in themselves and how the system, when
examined with enough care, can encompass such seemingly
contradictory descriptions and others, as well. The first definition
properly belongs on the outermost rung of the diagram—the level of
arbitrary signifiers. The second belongs to the next level in—that of
manners—and it is but one of the signifieds to which the signifier
refers, one of the meanings of the codes. But if my diagram makes

324

1650-1850

sense, there are other meanings on that level, such as respect for
others or modesty, which are signified or encoded in other etiquette
signs, for instance addressing others by titles while not doing so for
oneself.
When conflicts seem to arise between etiquette and morality (as
critics of etiquette invariably insist that they do), it is important to
conduct the debate on the proper level, and not compare things of
fundamentally different orders. I would propose that the conflict is
not usually one of etiquette vs. morality, but the signifiers of one
moral consideration coming up against the signified of another.
When the debate is conducted on the level of moral conflict, it is then
more possible to choose which moral good is better, and then to
follow it down to the level of which symbols are appropriate to
express that moral good.
This is not meant to imply that manners are always used for moral
purposes. Novelists often criticized the separation of manners from
their moral roots, in hopes of reforming them. Nor is it meant to
simplify the concept of ethical choice. It was a problem that deeply
concerned eighteenth-century writers—and not incidentally those
writing on the new genre of the novel. Henry Mackenzie wrote:
The Principal danger of novels, as forming a mistaken and
pernicious system of morality, seems to me to arise from that
contrast between one virtue of excellence and another, that war
of duties which is to be found in many of them, particularly in
that species called sentimental...In this rivalship of virtues and
duties, those are always likely to be preferred which in truth
and reason are subordinate and those to be degraded which
ought to be paramount...The virtues of justice, of prudence, of
economy, are put in competition with the exertions of
generosity, of benevolence, and of compassion.
But if choices must be made, they should be between similar
options, each on its own level, in order to reach a fair judgment of
the best possible action. No one would try to maintain that whether
you used "who" or "whom" in a sentence was more important than
whether the sentence was true; it is hard to imagine the two coming
The Lounger

18, 1785, in Works of Henry Mackenzie, Esq. Vol. V, 181-2.
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into conflict, because they occupy different structural levels. Once
you had decided to tell the truth, however, a correct judgment on the
"who or whom" question could aid the clarity of the statement, or
could even effect your listener's assessment of your expertise in the
subject. Careful judgments are even more important in the use of
etiquette. As we will see, novelists who argue against a particular
etiquette stricture are often proposing a better social expression of a
moral aim, rather than inveighing against the system of etiquette
itself.
For example, in the novel Evelina, discussing the heroine's refusal
to disclose the affairs of Mr. McCartney to Lord Orville in order to
protect her own reputation, Margaret Doody writes, "'Impropriety'
has become, not a matter of etiquette, or of pretty femininity; it has
been redefined as bearing a moral meaning. There are higher values
than conformity to a code of feminine conduct.
This is not a
matter of "redefinition," yet again pitting morality against etiquette,
however, but of finding the most appropriate virtues, and using the
manners expressions appropriate to them. Evelina realizes that the
rules involving giving and taking one's word, based as they are upon
honesty and related to justice and respect, are in this instance more
important than proprieties in male-female relations, even though those
are based in the important (and today much maligned) virtue of
modesty. Because someone else's reputation is at stake, and not
simply her own, Evelina realizes that her actions must be governed
by the virtues and manners on the left side of the fan, rather than
those on the right (see below). And Orville, realizing that this is an
issue of honor, which Burney is here arguing applies equally and
similarly to men and women, respects her silence.
The fan situates manners—ethics in day-to-day relations among
people—between the larger, more abstract concerns of society and the
state, such as law and government, and the personal, interior
operations of the self, such as contemplation or pure scholarship. In
other words, etiquette, if it were set up as a scholarly discipline,
would cover the area between sociology and psychology. As Elias
notes, reading people's etiquette signs, or what he calls

Margaret Anne Doody, Frances Bumcy: The Life in the Works (New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 64.
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This courtly art of human observation—unlike what we
usually call "psychology" today—is never concerned with the
individual in isolation, as if the essential features of his
behaviour were independent of his relations to others, and as
if he related to others, so to speak, only retrospectively. The
approach here is far closer to reality, in that the individual is
always seen in his social context, as a human being in his
relations to others, as an individual in a social situation}^
As one moves from left to right on the fan, the virtues or manners
move from more universal to more personal; in general, the farther
to the left the virtue is, the greater number of people it affects at any
one time, and the farther away they are from each other in Brown
and Levinson's concept of social distance, or what I call the relational
case of RANK. In other words, issues of justice and respect, in general,
operate more on larger groups of people, superiors and inferiors, and
strangers, while issues of gratitude or modesty are more personal and
affect more intimate groups, equals, or oneself.
Cicero defined the relationship of justice to the manners and
etiquette through which it is expressed: "It is the function of justice
not to do wrong to one's fellow-men; of considerateness, not to
wound their feelings; and in this the essence of propriety is best
seen.^'" Matthew Towle much later adds "JUSTICE is a Virtue, and
that Man who is blessed with it renders to God his due, to Man his
due, and to himself his due" (60). But in the eternal Enlightenment
quest for balance, justice, on the left hand side of the fan, could be
tempered by generosity, in the center, which is giving others more
than they are strictly due.
Contemporary writers knew that even such seemingly trivial
matters as table manners were based on deeper considerations, and
placed them at the more personal end of the spectrum. (Like
anything based on such fundamental principles, they are far from
trivial, of course. Emerson wrote, "I could better eat with one who
did not respect the truth or the laws than with a sloven and
Power and Civility 274.
De Offlciis Bk. I. 99.
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unpresentable person."^' So much for the hierarchy of major and
minor morals.) Matthew Towle, writing on behavior at meals,
advised, "These are the principal Rules which you are to observe;
Time, Decency, Moderation, and Complaisance" (163), or, as they
appear on the fan: punctuality (part of consideration), modesty,
appropriateness, and the desire to please.
Among the virtues expressed in manners, honesty is an interesting
particular case, because honesty seldom shows up in an unmitigated
form in the realm of etiquette other than in rules against
pretentiousness and for giving or taking one's word of honor. More
often, it gets pulled toward and modified by either respect, thus being
expressed in rules on refraining from insult, or generosity, in those
concerning compliments. The mannerly representations of honesty,
candour and sincerity, although they become increasingly important
to the definition of true politeness as the century progresses, are still
often modified by other functions. As Pope put it in the Essay on
Criticism,
'Tis not enough your counsel still be true.
Blunt Truths more Mischief than nice Falshoods do;
Men must be taught as if you taught them not-,
And Things unknown propos'd as Things forgot:
Without Good Breeding, Truth is disapprov'd;
That only makes Superior Sense Belov'd. (572-77)
Like honesty and its outgrowth sincerity, the question of
temperance and appropriateness or moderation, on the other end of
the spectrum, is strongly tied up in issues of true vs. false politeness.
Manners that call attention to themselves are no manners at all.
Cicero says, for instance, that ostentatious benevolence is not
generosity. Behavior "must be made to obey the reins of reason and
neither allowed to run ahead of it nor from listlessness or indolence
to lag behind; but people should enjoy calm and be free from every
sort of passion."'° The essence of Cicero's propriety is temperance and
appropriateness, the Aristotelian mean.
" Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays: First and Second Series (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,
1951) Second Series, "Essay IV: Manners." 81.
® De Officiis I. XXIX. 102-
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But where then is the place for the noble, grand gesture? For
passion, even the passion for virtue? This is a question that would
occur more readily to a post-Romantic mind than an eighteenthcentury one, which would always value balance over excess, but it
deserves to be addressed. One possible answer is that to that
eighteenth-century mind, an action could be so appropriate, so full of
decorum, as to take on a beauty all its own. A gesture can be grand
and noble in its very refusal to take notice of itself—-and we come
back to the refusal of ostentation in favor of quiet dignity; to the
golden mean. Power under voluntary restraint is one form of beauty;
one of the loveliest sights in nature is a lion in repose. This is
moderation raised to an art form, which will be discussed more in the
section on aesthetics, below.
But for Cicero, moderation was also "the science of disposing
aright everything that is done or said,"^' a line which is paraphrased
or footnoted in both Rules of Civility and The Gentlewomans
Companion, two well-known conduct books of the period. The
systematic approach to the study of manners I am attempting here
would not be alien to Cicero or his followers, and the proper balance
seems sometimes as exacting to find as the correct weighting of a
scientific scale. This is especially true in the delicate equilibrium of
ceremony vs. ease, as can be seen in the complex instructions in the
matter presented in Rules of Civility.
If you make it a Point to use unnecessary Ceremonies, you
mistake Ceremony for Politeness, and in a trifling frothy
Manner sacrifice your Friendship to Compliments, and even
your Sincerity to Ceremony.
Abandon unnecessary Ceremonies, as that is a Kind of slow
Poison to your Friend and all your Acquaintance, which will
make them not only forsake you, but oblige them to laugh at
your folly.
But, on the other Hand, I would advise you not to be void
of Ceremony, that will make you appear sensible and well
bred:
Friendly Freedom is, as it were the Picture of
Friendship, for by that we distinguish Friends from Foes. Real
Politeness is attended with Ease and Freedom, it is a sworn
" De Officiis I. XL. 142.
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Enemy to every Thing that is unnatural and affected. But, a
proper Deportment, a little Ceremony, is necessary to
recommend you, as in Moderation they are consistent with
Politeness; 'tis carrying Ceremony to excess that renders it
odious and blameable."
To make matters more complicated, the balance point was apparently
changing during the course of the period. Addison analyzed the
process, making an interesting religious comparison, given the
political and religious issues he was trying to assuage:
Conversation, like the Romish Religion, was so encumbered
with Show and Ceremony, that it stood in need of a
Reformation to retrench its superfluities, and restore it to its
natural good Sense and Beauty. At present therefore an
unconstrained Carriage, and a certain Openness of Behaviour
are the height of Good breeding. The Fashionable World is
grown free and easie; our Manners, sit more loose upon us:
Nothing is so modish as an agreeable Negligence. In a word.
Good Breeding shows it self most, where to an ordinary Eye
it appears the least.
The town took the lead in this, of course, and
A Polite Country squire shall make you as many Bows in half
an Hour, as would serve a Courtier for a week. There is
infinitely more to do about Place and Precedency in a Meeting
of Justices Wives, than in an Assembly of Dutchesses.
(Addison, Spectator 119)
It is an interesting paradox that every generation congratulates itself
that its manners are more relaxed than those of the one before. Even
the highly respectable Victorians, while addressing their spouses as
"Mr." and "Mrs.," congratulated themselves that they were less
ceremonious than their Georgian forbears. In part, the eighteenth[Antoine De Courtin], The Rules of Civility; or Certain Ways of Deportment observed in
France, amongst all Persons of Quality, upon several occasions. Translated out of the French.
(London, 1671), 143.
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century version of this anti-ceremony bias was an English reaction
against French preciousness and hierarchy. But it was also a matter
of having to change the rules again, to bring back sprezzatura or noble
nonchalance as a sign of good breeding; when the middle class started
getting the hang of the more complicated ceremonies, the upper
classes had to introduce something more nebulous as its passport.
This is a precise parallel to the move from "hard word" dictionaries
of the seventeenth century as guides to genteel speech, to proscribed
lists of vulgarly over-refined words in later etiquette books. Once set
rules or conventions became available to all, judgment came to be
deemed necessary to distinguish the truly well-bred from the merely
aspiring. Still, most of those writers who criticized ceremoniousness
in the eighteenth century were not condemning wholesale the concept
of etiquette (as most modern critics assume), but were trying to find
the proper balance between proper decorum and graceful negligence,
which was one of the most demanding and delicate arts that etiquette
itself recommends.
Thus, to return to the fan, judgment or Wisdom, and Courage, at
the top of the fan just below ethics, are the two interior virtues that
make all the others possible. As Towle puts it, using slightly different
terms, "FORTITUDE, [that is, courage] dear Reader, is a Virtue. I
shall give it a Place next to Prudence [i.e. wisdom], as the one cannot
do well without the other" (50). On the fan I have placed courage
more on the side of justice and wisdom on the side of temperance,
because, although both of these are needed in applying all the other
virtues, courage is perhaps somewhat more necessary in dealing with
the large and weighty workings of the state, while wisdom is slightly
more necessary in the search for knowledge and balance relating to
personal issues such as temperance. But as with all else, the most
important element is balance. As Rules of Civility advised, "Work the
two Extremes by that sweet Rule Wisdom, and then I make not the
least Doubt you will find the Mean. In order to find out the true and
only Way is to behave well" (144).
Self-respect, or civility of an individual towards him- or herself, is
where the sticks of the fan meet. While the fan exists in the
mediating space between the lai^er universal realm and the personal
realm of the individual, self-respect brings the two sides together. It
is the knowledge of one's own worth, or what the larger world owes
the individual, and the specific behaviors which signal that, while the
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rest of the fan concerns the obligations of the individual to society.
It applies the sense of moderation and the Aristotelian mean to the
concept of Respect, saving it from the possibility of servility. This
concept, too, is reflected in eighteenth-century manners writing:
"NOW by this Time you know how to set a just Value upon
yourself, you know your Rank and Birth, you know what Respect
from others towards you is due. Now you are to respect yourself
accordingly, but take Care that you do not set too great a Value upon
yourself" (Towle 169). Here, too, the necessary concomitant virtues
were judgment and moderation. Snobbery was considered as much
a breach of etiquette as ceremoniousness.
So morality and manners, while not in any simphstic sense
identical, were perhaps not as far apart in the eighteenth century as
we have since come to believe. Chesterfield, the patron saint of
civility, famously accused of immorality by Johnson, was aware of
the lack of moral instruction in his advice, but rather than dismissing
it, he states several times that he is putting aside moral issues as
something actually too important to be discussed in his letters:
[To his son] You know what virtue is; you may have it if
you will; it is in every man's power, and miserable is the man
who has it not. (March 6, 1747)
[To his godson] As to your religious and moral obligations I
shall say nothing, because I know that you are thoroughly
informed of them, and hope that you will scrupulously observe
them, for if you do not you can neither be happy here nor
hereafter. (1769)"
If one is tempted to reject these as lip service to the idea of morality,
it should be remembered that these were private letters. Chesterfield
would have no reason to make such statements except for the good
of his correspondent, even if he himself was a religious skeptic. He
apparently believed in the value of moral instruction, but simply felt
it could be better gained from other sources, while he had lessons to
teach that could not be learned elsewhere. He did not teach manners
The Earl of Chesterfield, Tie Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield,
edited and with introduction by Bonamy Dobree, 3 Vols., (London and New York: Eyre
& Spottiswoode, 1932; rp. New York: AMS Press, 1968). Cited by date of letter.
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to the exclusion of morality, but manners as the necessary polish of
morality: "politeness and good breeding are absolutely necessary to
adorn any, or all other good qualities or talents. Without them, no
knowledge, no perfection whatsoever, is seen in its best light. The
scholar, without good breeding, is a pedant; the philosopher, a cynic;
the soldier, a brute; and every man disagreeable" (Oct. 9, 1747). The
idea of graceful behavior, above and beyond good behavior, was a
highly esteemed value of the time. "Sacrifice to the Graces,"
Chesterfield admonished his son, and as the classically-aware era
knew, the Graces were half-sisters to the Muses.

^ Etiquette and Aesthetics
In an era when truth and beauty were still considered closely aligned,
the idea of aesthetics as another branch of the search for ethical good
should not be underestimated, especially in literary art forms
themselves. What modern readers tend to miss is the aesthetic
satisfaction that can be found in reading about good people behaving
well, about justice being done. As Hunter puts it.
The mixing of discursive and narrative modes, like intentions
to at once instruct and delight, sometimes led to formal
achievement and aesthetic satisfaction, but appreciating such
works depends on understanding how competing aims achieved
creative balance. To describe works we find readable today as
triumphs of narrative over didactic impulses—or as victories of
art over moral expectations— is not only to miss the historical
point but the aesthetic one. What was brewing in the
seventeenth century, as variations on Horatianism were
explored in different proportions was a powerful modern elixir
with both ideological and aesthetic power. (301)
Even in only the formal, rather than the didactic, dimension of
art, there is, as in the music of Mozart, great satisfaction in knowing
where the cadence will go next, and how it will be resolved, even if
the particular piece is one never heard before. As Hunter adds,
"pleasure in hearing familiar formulas and phrases....The pleasures of
repetition and the comforts of familiarity are seldom given their due
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in sophisticated literary theory"
(235). Balance, beauty and
refinement were still aesthetic values in the eighteenth century.
In all the worthwhile concern about class, gender and power in
art, it is possible to lose sight of the importance of art itself.
Aesthetic consideration can be as strong a motivator of artistic and
social creation as cruder concerns of ideology. In fact, as Efizabeth
Goldsmith documents in her book on the French salon culture.
Exclusive Conversations, genteel conversation in seventeenth-century
France became a refuge from the political machinations of court.^''
The etymology of "polite," let us remember, has nothing to do with
politics; and the word was apphed to literature before it was applied
to manners. It is no accident that so many of these words, such as
manner and decorum have special uses in early literary and artistic
criticism. (Interestingly enough, it was apparently Frances Burney
who first applied the term "propriety" to manners, rather than art.)
Sir Joshua Reynolds, in his lectures to the Royal Academy, said,
"the sense of congruity, coherence, and consistency...is a real existing
principle in man; and it must be gratified"". He understood what
we in our post-Romantic, post-sixties era have forgotten: that one
definition of art is to bring order out of chaos, and spontaneity and
rebellion are meaningless without some structured context. Restriction
can often increase pleasure, be it aesthetic, romantic or (as some of
Foucault's work points out) even sexual. In narrative, too, a major
principle of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novel is the
postponement of the romantic gratification of the hero and heroine;
if they could indulge their desires immediately, there would be no
story (as many a modern movie demonstrates by attempting to prove
the opposite). Earlier, the very cornerstone of chivalric romance was
the indefinite postponement of gratificp.tion—to indulge at all would
ruin the romantic and aesthetic effect. Eighteenth-century thinkers
realized that often desire can be more pleasurable than gratification;
as Johnson put it, "The natural flights of the human mind are not
from pleasure to pleasure, but from hope to hope" {fiambler 2).
" Elizabeth C. Goldsmith, < <Exclusive Conversations> > The Art of Interaction in
Seventeenth-Century France (Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988).
Sir Joshua Reynolds, DISCOURSE XIII, in Geoffrey Tillotson, Paul Fussell, Jr. and
Marshall Waingrow, eds., Eighteenth-Century English Literature (San Diego: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1969), 1224.
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That the best artistic expression must be contained within the
strictures of meter or genre was a major aesthetic principle of the
eighteenth century. Oliver Goldsmith expressed this concept in his
simile comparing imagination to water spouting out of a pipe in a
fountain; if the aperture of the spout is constricted, the water plays
higher. Similarly, Sir Joshua Reynolds insisted, "Every opportunity,
therefore, should be taken to discountenance that false and vulgar
opinion, that rules are the fetters of genius; they are fetters only to
men of no genius." It is a basic principle of semiotics that subtle but
significant variations within a prescribed structure or set of rules
produce meaning, but they also provide aesthetic pleasure. Art is, in
one sense, the tension between innovation and rules, but it cannot
exist without rules of some kind. Even Roland Barthes argued "that
it is impossible either to play or to be free without a coherent
structure."'^
It is this sense of rules being vital to art that gives rise to the side
of etiquette that deals with appropriateness and grace. Moreover, these
aesthetic values that readers appreciated in novels and conduct books
they genuinely tried to practice in their own lives. As Hunter
recognizes in reference to conduct books; "To attain completion or
even closure, they must not only be read—like poems or novels—but
lived out in some explicit way. The text is not completed by the act
of reading" (301). The same principles were considered to hold true
in manners as in art.
There is an aesthetic appeal to "doing things right" that the
eighteenth-century mind felt very strongly. If, as I argue in other
work on this subject, etiquette is a language, it is possible to use it to
write poetry, as it were. To write poetry with one's actions was a
fundamental purpose of the etiquette system in the eighteenth
century.
A few modern critics have addressed the issue of art being subject
to rules of decorum. As Woodman points out, "In the ancient ideal
of decorum a link between literature and manners has always been
recognized. Since, as a Restoration commentator put it, 'Writing is
a sort of conversing,' it has to be governed by a similar etiquette"
(15). But the equation is transitive. Many of the attributes and
" Eve Tavor Bannet, Structuralism artd the Logic of Dissent (London: The Macmillan Press
Ltd., 1989), 87.
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qualities of social life at the time can be usefully examined in
reference to art, as well. Another definition of art in the eighteenth
century was "prudence and skill in social encounters" (Sheriff 24). If,
as Maria Corti defines them, genres are "social phenomena of artistic
communication,'"^ etiquette can be seen as just the reverse; in its
highest form it is an artistic manifestation of social communication.
Polite dialogue was the best form for giving an aesthetic dimension
to sociability.'^ What Elizabeth Goldsmith elsewhere discusses as the
art of self-making, or "the art of sociable living," (24) was becoming
an end in itself, apart from considerations social advancement. It
"involves the saying of something not for an extra verbal advantage
to be got by the saying, but because of a satisfaction intrinsic to the
saying,"" or what ethicist Alasdair Mclntyre calls a practice with its
own internal goods*°. Michael McKeon suggests that at this time,
aristocratic manners underwent "the more elaborate sort of
'theatricalization' that is likely to occur whenever social convention
is raised to the level of self-conscious practice.'"" The aristocracy
elaborated their manners not only to form barriers against the
challenge from below, but to help identify themselves to themselves.
They were creating themselves as works of art, both for pure aesthetic
expression, and as a way of preserving their identity.
During this century, art was highly involved with rising
refinement, and refinement itself was a kind of art. Even morality
itself became almost a part of this art of refinement: "For those,
women especially, rich enough to enjoy the luxury of a conscience,
goodness became a more introspective, and even aesthetic, matter,
involving cultivating and exercising finer, more sensitive feelings"
(Porter 305).
It is no accident that when he begins to define decorum Cicero
immediately switches into aesthetic and artistic terms, describing it in
terms of harmony and poetry. "For, as physical beauty with
Maria Corti, An Introduction to Literary Semiotics, tr. Margherita Begat and Allen
Mandelbaum (Boomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978), 133.
Goldsmith, Exclusive Conversations, 12.
Kenneth Burke, 269, quoted in Goldsmith, 26.
^ Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Indiana:
Universitiy of Notre Dame Press, 1984).
Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 198^ 169.
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harmonious symmetry of the limbs engages the attention and delights
the eye, for the very reason that all the parts combine in harmony
and grace, so this propriety, which shines out in our conduct, engages
the approbation of our fellow-men by the order, consistency, and selfcontrol it imposes upon every word and deed" {De Officiis I. XXVIII.
98). He takes the artistic metaphor for behavior even further when
he writes:
flagrant breaches of good breeding, like singing in the streets or
any other gross misconduct, are easily apparent and do not call
especially for admonition and instruction. But we must even
more carefully avoid those seemingly trivial faults which pass
unnoticed by the many. However slightly out of tune a harp
or flute may be, the fault is still detected by a connoisseur; so
we must be on the watch lest haply something in our life be
out of tune—nay, rather, far greater is the need for painstaking,
inasmuch as harmony of actions is far better than harmony of
sounds. [De Officiis I.XL. 145)
Cicero's philosophy is directly echoed, and even quoted, in
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century conduct books. Courtin's Rules
of Civility reads:
But the pleasing of the corporal eye being but a trifle, unless
we can order things so, as to make ourselves grateful to the eye of
the Soul, it is not that outward address or becomingness, which is
the true principle and form of a gentleman; it is something more
substantial and solid, which discovers the disposition of our soul
rather than the Gesticulations of our body. (4)
and includes the footnote "Neque enim solum corporis qui ad
naturam apri sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui
item ad naturam accomodati sunt," which is translated in the Loeb as
"For it is only when they agree with Nature's Laws that we should
give our approval to the movements not only of the body, but still
more of the spirit" (De Officiis Bk, I, Sect. 100).
Thus decorum or propriety, one major element of etiquette, (rather
than being strictly linked to property, as Tony Tanner argues in his
book on Jane Austen) is ideally the ultimate fusion of the aesthetic
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and the moral—the beautiful and the good. And Cicero even goes so
far as to make this quality part of his definition of Man: "man is the
only animal that has a feeling for order, for propriety, for moderation
in word and deed. And so no other animal has a sense of beauty,
loveliness, harmony in the visible world; and Nature and Reason,
extending the analogy of this from the world of sense to the world of
spirit, find that beauty, consistency, order are far more to be
maintained in thought and deed, and the same Nature and Reason are
careful to do nothing in an improper or unmanly fashion" (Bk I. IV.
14). From order, propriety and moderation, through beauty and
harmony, through Nature and Reason, and back to propriety again,
the wheel of human behavior and values comes full circle, and always
back to manners.
From Cicero's day down through the eighteenth century, ethics,
aesthetics and etiquette were thus joined in a complex dance, more
closely intertwined than we in more recent eras have been led to
believe. Their interrelationship was expressed in the popular conduct
guides of the day, both practical and fictional, and taken to heart and
lived out by those who read them. Rather than being in any way
trivial or peripheral, these guides dealt with some of the most
fundamental issues of living, providing a bridge between internal
concepts of good and the outer world. Rather than being the
ideological baggage of an unenlightened age, through which modern
readers must root to dig out aesthetic treasures, they are vital texts,
central to the concerns of the age, and can even provide insight for us
today.
It seems hardly to cross the mind of the modern critic that there
could be something genuinely instructive, let alone aesthetically
appealing, in the messages these eighteenth-century authors were
trying to inculcate. The most progressive view sees such texts,
apparently, only as relics from a foigotten world to be decoded in the
laudable quest for historical imagination, rather than living evidence
of other minds, through which we might enrich our own.
The major purpose of education was once to learn from the past.
Its purpose now seems to be to teach lessons to the past by
application of our more enlightened ideas of the present. The furthest
some critics will go is to admit that young dogs can sometimes teach
old dogs new tricks. Maria Corti, for instance, points out, as if
conceding something graciously, that "the models offered by the
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young can be imitated by the no longer young" (Corti 7). But what
has happened to the idea of the young actually learning from what
came before them? The currently fashionable principles of
multiculturalism—the desirability of learning from ways of thinking
different from our prevailing one—could be applied historically, as
well as cross-culturally Once we get around our own critical
prejudices against moral instruction, we can begin to examine the vast
impact, ethical and aesthetic, that conduct books had on the novels,
and perhaps even on the history, of the eighteenth century.

